* Fixed mangos-realmds autopatching system

This commit is contained in:
arrai 2008-10-18 00:11:12 +02:00
parent a3689bfe3c
commit dbb399d808
2 changed files with 162 additions and 151 deletions

View file

@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ typedef struct XFER_INIT
{
uint8 cmd; // XFER_INITIATE
uint8 fileNameLen; // strlen(fileName);
uint8 fileName[1]; // fileName[fileNameLen]
uint8 fileName[5]; // fileName[fileNameLen]
uint64 file_size; // file size (bytes)
uint8 md5[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]; // MD5
}XFER_INIT;
@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ AuthSocket::AuthSocket(ISocketHandler &h) : TcpSocket(h)
N.SetHexStr("894B645E89E1535BBDAD5B8B290650530801B18EBFBF5E8FAB3C82872A3E9BB7");
g.SetDword(7);
_authed = false;
pPatch=NULL;
pPatch = NULL;
_accountSecurityLevel = SEC_PLAYER;
}
@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ AuthSocket::AuthSocket(ISocketHandler &h) : TcpSocket(h)
/// Close patch file descriptor before leaving
AuthSocket::~AuthSocket()
{
ZThread::Guard<ZThread::Mutex> g(patcherLock);
if(pPatch)
fclose(pPatch);
}
@ -358,6 +359,7 @@ bool AuthSocket::_HandleLogonChallenge()
ByteBuffer pkt;
_login = (const char*)ch->I;
_build = ch->build;
///- Normalize account name
//utf8ToUpperOnlyLatin(_login); -- client already send account in expected form
@ -367,154 +369,169 @@ bool AuthSocket::_HandleLogonChallenge()
_safelogin=_login;
dbRealmServer.escape_string(_safelogin);
pkt << (uint8) AUTH_LOGON_CHALLENGE;
pkt << (uint8) 0x00;
///- Verify that this IP is not in the ip_banned table
// No SQL injection possible (paste the IP address as passed by the socket)
dbRealmServer.Execute("DELETE FROM ip_banned WHERE unbandate<=UNIX_TIMESTAMP() AND unbandate<>bandate");
std::string address = GetRemoteAddress();
dbRealmServer.escape_string(address);
QueryResult *result = dbRealmServer.PQuery( "SELECT * FROM ip_banned WHERE ip = '%s'",address.c_str());
if(result)
{
pkt << (uint8)REALM_AUTH_ACCOUNT_BANNED;
sLog.outBasic("[AuthChallenge] Banned ip %s tries to login!",GetRemoteAddress().c_str ());
delete result;
}
else
{
///- Get the account details from the account table
// No SQL injection (escaped user name)
result = dbRealmServer.PQuery("SELECT sha_pass_hash,id,locked,last_ip,gmlevel FROM account WHERE username = '%s'",_safelogin.c_str ());
if( result )
{
///- If the IP is 'locked', check that the player comes indeed from the correct IP address
bool locked = false;
if((*result)[2].GetUInt8() == 1) // if ip is locked
{
DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] Account '%s' is locked to IP - '%s'", _login.c_str(), (*result)[3].GetString());
DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] Player address is '%s'", GetRemoteAddress().c_str());
if ( strcmp((*result)[3].GetString(),GetRemoteAddress().c_str()) )
{
DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] Account IP differs");
pkt << (uint8) REALM_AUTH_ACCOUNT_FREEZED;
locked=true;
}
else
{
DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] Account IP matches");
}
}
else
{
DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] Account '%s' is not locked to ip", _login.c_str());
}
if (!locked)
{
//set expired bans to inactive
dbRealmServer.Execute("UPDATE account_banned SET active = 0 WHERE unbandate<=UNIX_TIMESTAMP() AND unbandate<>bandate");
///- If the account is banned, reject the logon attempt
QueryResult *banresult = dbRealmServer.PQuery("SELECT bandate,unbandate FROM account_banned WHERE id = %u AND active = 1", (*result)[1].GetUInt32());
if(banresult)
{
if((*banresult)[0].GetUInt64() == (*banresult)[1].GetUInt64())
{
pkt << (uint8) REALM_AUTH_ACCOUNT_BANNED;
sLog.outBasic("[AuthChallenge] Banned account %s tries to login!",_login.c_str ());
}
else
{
pkt << (uint8) REALM_AUTH_ACCOUNT_FREEZED;
sLog.outBasic("[AuthChallenge] Temporarily banned account %s tries to login!",_login.c_str ());
}
delete banresult;
}
else
{
///- Get the password from the account table, upper it, and make the SRP6 calculation
std::string rI = (*result)[0].GetCppString();
_SetVSFields(rI);
b.SetRand(19 * 8);
BigNumber gmod=g.ModExp(b, N);
B = ((v * 3) + gmod) % N;
ASSERT(gmod.GetNumBytes() <= 32);
BigNumber unk3;
unk3.SetRand(16*8);
///- Fill the response packet with the result
pkt << (uint8)REALM_AUTH_SUCCESS;
// B may be calculated < 32B so we force minnimal length to 32B
pkt.append(B.AsByteArray(32), 32); // 32 bytes
pkt << (uint8)1;
pkt.append(g.AsByteArray(), 1);
pkt << (uint8)32;
pkt.append(N.AsByteArray(), 32);
pkt.append(s.AsByteArray(), s.GetNumBytes()); // 32 bytes
pkt.append(unk3.AsByteArray(), 16);
pkt << (uint8)0; // Added in 1.12.x client branch
uint8 secLevel = (*result)[4].GetUInt8();
_accountSecurityLevel = secLevel <= SEC_ADMINISTRATOR ? AccountTypes(secLevel) : SEC_ADMINISTRATOR;
_localizationName.resize(4);
for(int i = 0; i <4; ++i)
_localizationName[i] = ch->country[4-i-1];
sLog.outBasic("[AuthChallenge] account %s is using '%c%c%c%c' locale (%u)", _login.c_str (), ch->country[3],ch->country[2],ch->country[1],ch->country[0], GetLocaleByName(_localizationName));
}
}
delete result;
}
else //no account
{
pkt<< (uint8) REALM_AUTH_NO_MATCH;
}
}
SendBuf((char const*)pkt.contents(), pkt.size());
return true;
}
/// Logon Proof command handler
bool AuthSocket::_HandleLogonProof()
{
DEBUG_LOG("Entering _HandleLogonProof");
///- Read the packet
if (ibuf.GetLength() < sizeof(sAuthLogonProof_C))
return false;
sAuthLogonProof_C lp;
ibuf.Read((char *)&lp, sizeof(sAuthLogonProof_C));
///- Check if the client has one of the expected version numbers
bool valid_version=false;
int accepted_versions[]=EXPECTED_MANGOS_CLIENT_BUILD;
for(int i=0;accepted_versions[i];i++)
if(ch->build==accepted_versions[i])
{
valid_version=true;
break;
if(_build==accepted_versions[i])
{
valid_version=true;
break;
}
}
/// <ul><li> if this is a valid version
if(valid_version)
{
pkt << (uint8) AUTH_LOGON_CHALLENGE;
pkt << (uint8) 0x00;
///- Verify that this IP is not in the ip_banned table
// No SQL injection possible (paste the IP address as passed by the socket)
dbRealmServer.Execute("DELETE FROM ip_banned WHERE unbandate<=UNIX_TIMESTAMP() AND unbandate<>bandate");
std::string address = GetRemoteAddress();
dbRealmServer.escape_string(address);
QueryResult *result = dbRealmServer.PQuery( "SELECT * FROM ip_banned WHERE ip = '%s'",address.c_str());
if(result)
{
pkt << (uint8)REALM_AUTH_ACCOUNT_BANNED;
sLog.outBasic("[AuthChallenge] Banned ip %s tries to login!",GetRemoteAddress().c_str ());
delete result;
}
else
{
///- Get the account details from the account table
// No SQL injection (escaped user name)
result = dbRealmServer.PQuery("SELECT sha_pass_hash,id,locked,last_ip,gmlevel FROM account WHERE username = '%s'",_safelogin.c_str ());
if( result )
{
///- If the IP is 'locked', check that the player comes indeed from the correct IP address
bool locked = false;
if((*result)[2].GetUInt8() == 1) // if ip is locked
{
DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] Account '%s' is locked to IP - '%s'", _login.c_str(), (*result)[3].GetString());
DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] Player address is '%s'", GetRemoteAddress().c_str());
if ( strcmp((*result)[3].GetString(),GetRemoteAddress().c_str()) )
{
DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] Account IP differs");
pkt << (uint8) REALM_AUTH_ACCOUNT_FREEZED;
locked=true;
}
else
{
DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] Account IP matches");
}
}
else
{
DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] Account '%s' is not locked to ip", _login.c_str());
}
if (!locked)
{
//set expired bans to inactive
dbRealmServer.Execute("UPDATE account_banned SET active = 0 WHERE unbandate<=UNIX_TIMESTAMP() AND unbandate<>bandate");
///- If the account is banned, reject the logon attempt
QueryResult *banresult = dbRealmServer.PQuery("SELECT bandate,unbandate FROM account_banned WHERE id = %u AND active = 1", (*result)[1].GetUInt32());
if(banresult)
{
if((*banresult)[0].GetUInt64() == (*banresult)[1].GetUInt64())
{
pkt << (uint8) REALM_AUTH_ACCOUNT_BANNED;
sLog.outBasic("[AuthChallenge] Banned account %s tries to login!",_login.c_str ());
}
else
{
pkt << (uint8) REALM_AUTH_ACCOUNT_FREEZED;
sLog.outBasic("[AuthChallenge] Temporarily banned account %s tries to login!",_login.c_str ());
}
delete banresult;
}
else
{
///- Get the password from the account table, upper it, and make the SRP6 calculation
std::string rI = (*result)[0].GetCppString();
_SetVSFields(rI);
b.SetRand(19 * 8);
BigNumber gmod=g.ModExp(b, N);
B = ((v * 3) + gmod) % N;
ASSERT(gmod.GetNumBytes() <= 32);
BigNumber unk3;
unk3.SetRand(16*8);
///- Fill the response packet with the result
pkt << (uint8)REALM_AUTH_SUCCESS;
// B may be calculated < 32B so we force minnimal length to 32B
pkt.append(B.AsByteArray(32), 32); // 32 bytes
pkt << (uint8)1;
pkt.append(g.AsByteArray(), 1);
pkt << (uint8)32;
pkt.append(N.AsByteArray(), 32);
pkt.append(s.AsByteArray(), s.GetNumBytes()); // 32 bytes
pkt.append(unk3.AsByteArray(), 16);
pkt << (uint8)0; // Added in 1.12.x client branch
uint8 secLevel = (*result)[4].GetUInt8();
_accountSecurityLevel = secLevel <= SEC_ADMINISTRATOR ? AccountTypes(secLevel) : SEC_ADMINISTRATOR;
std::string localeName;
localeName.resize(4);
for(int i = 0; i <4; ++i)
localeName[i] = ch->country[4-i-1];
_localization = GetLocaleByName(localeName);
sLog.outBasic("[AuthChallenge] account %s is using '%c%c%c%c' locale (%u)", _login.c_str (), ch->country[3],ch->country[2],ch->country[1],ch->country[0], _localization);
}
}
delete result;
}
else //no account
{
pkt<< (uint8) REALM_AUTH_NO_MATCH;
}
}
} //valid version
else
///<li> else
/// <ul><li> If the client has no valid version
if(!valid_version)
{
///- Check if we have the apropriate patch on the disk
char tmp[64];
// 24 = len("./patches/65535enGB.mpq")+1
char tmp[24];
// No buffer overflow (fixed length of arguments)
sprintf(tmp,"./patches/%d%c%c%c%c.mpq",ch->build,ch->country[3],
ch->country[2],ch->country[1],ch->country[0]);
sprintf(tmp,"./patches/%d%s.mpq",_build, _localizationName.c_str());
// This will be closed at the destruction of the AuthSocket (client deconnection)
FILE *pFile=fopen(tmp,"rb");
if(!pFile)
{
ByteBuffer pkt;
pkt << (uint8) AUTH_LOGON_CHALLENGE;
pkt << (uint8) 0x00;
pkt << (uint8) REALM_AUTH_WRONG_BUILD_NUMBER;
DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] %u is not a valid client version!", ch->build);
DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] %u is not a valid client version!", _build);
DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] Patch %s not found",tmp);
}else
{ //have patch
SendBuf((char const*)pkt.contents(), pkt.size());
return true;
}
else // have patch
{
pPatch=pFile;
XFER_INIT xferh;
@ -544,20 +561,6 @@ bool AuthSocket::_HandleLogonChallenge()
}
}
/// </ul>
SendBuf((char const*)pkt.contents(), pkt.size());
return true;
}
/// Logon Proof command handler
bool AuthSocket::_HandleLogonProof()
{
DEBUG_LOG("Entering _HandleLogonProof");
///- Read the packet
if (ibuf.GetLength() < sizeof(sAuthLogonProof_C))
return false;
sAuthLogonProof_C lp;
ibuf.Read((char *)&lp, sizeof(sAuthLogonProof_C));
///- Continue the SRP6 calculation based on data received from the client
BigNumber A;
@ -636,7 +639,7 @@ bool AuthSocket::_HandleLogonProof()
///- Update the sessionkey, last_ip, last login time and reset number of failed logins in the account table for this account
// No SQL injection (escaped user name) and IP address as received by socket
const char* K_hex = K.AsHexStr();
dbRealmServer.PExecute("UPDATE account SET sessionkey = '%s', last_ip = '%s', last_login = NOW(), locale = '%u', failed_logins = 0 WHERE username = '%s'", K_hex, GetRemoteAddress().c_str(), _localization, _safelogin.c_str() );
dbRealmServer.PExecute("UPDATE account SET sessionkey = '%s', last_ip = '%s', last_login = NOW(), locale = '%u', failed_logins = 0 WHERE username = '%s'", K_hex, GetRemoteAddress().c_str(), GetLocaleByName(_localizationName), _safelogin.c_str() );
OPENSSL_free((void*)K_hex);
///- Finish SRP6 and send the final result to the client
@ -848,6 +851,7 @@ PatcherRunnable::PatcherRunnable(class AuthSocket * as)
/// Send content of patch file to the client
void PatcherRunnable::run()
{
ZThread::Guard<ZThread::Mutex> g(mySocket->patcherLock);
XFER_DATA_STRUCT xfdata;
xfdata.opcode = XFER_DATA;
@ -909,10 +913,11 @@ void Patcher::LoadPatchesInfo()
if(hFil==INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
return; //no patches were found
LoadPatchMD5(fil.cFileName);
while(FindNextFile(hFil,&fil))
do
{
LoadPatchMD5(fil.cFileName);
}
while(FindNextFile(hFil,&fil));
}
#endif