This was possible by using cheating tools only; the client denies such
actions without sending CMSG_AUCTION_PLACE_BID.
Thanks to leak for reporting this vulnerability.
* Move send functions to new MailDraft class from WorldSession
* Simplify use different args combinations used in SendMailTo
by groupping its by functionality in Helper classes. This also will prevent wrong way use args combinations.
* This let more easy catch packet structure chnages at client switch.
* Fixed structure CMSG_GUILD_BANK_SWAP_ITEMS
* Fixed structure CMSG_SPLIT_ITEM, CMSG_SELL_ITEM
* Added read data amount fixes for some other packets.
Thanks to TOM_RUS in help check correct packets structure.
Note: not all packets possible fixed. Please report for not fixed cases at errors:
"opcode %s (0x%.4X) have unprocessed tail data (read stop at %u from %u)"
CHECK_PACKET_SIZE was pretty error prone; once it was forgotten mangosd
could crash due to the asserts in ByteBuffer.h. That was exploitable by
malicious players.
Furthermore, there were duplicate checks: Additionally to
CHECK_PACKET_SIZE, the ByteBuffer assertions keept an eye
on not exceeding the packet boundaries - just to crash the server for
sure in such a case.
To prevent memory leaks or other undesirable states, please read in
every handler all variables _before_ doing any concrete handling.
* Replace platform seelction MaNGOS code for select format descriptor for uint64 by using ACE define.
I64FMTD renamed to UI64FMTD for more clear name.
* Add new define UI64LIT (base at ACE seelction) for build portables uint64 literals.
Please always use UI64LIT(0x00001) instead less portable 0x00001LL
